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SPEECHES 
WHAT'S So SPECIAL ABOUT AMERICAN LAw?* 
WILLIAM B. EWALD** 
I. 
Today I want to talk about the question, "What's so special about 
American law?" And let me begin by saying something about why this is 
a question worth asking. 
I have two reasons for being interested in this question. The first is a 
matter of practical pedagogy. Every year I teach an introductory course in 
American law to a class of foreign students, most of whom are already 
practicing attorneys back home. So they know what a court is and how to 
read a statute and how to draft a contract; but beyond those generalities 
there is surprisingly little we can take for granted. Obviously, if you are 
going to say anything worthwhile to people like that, you need some idea 
of what is special about American law, and what sets it apart from law back 
home-otherwise you will just end up telling them what they already know. 
So I looked into the books published in Europe and designed to explain 
the American legal system to European lawyers. The standard texts all take 
a "legal families" approach. That is, they say the world divides into five or 
six legal families-for example, Islamic law, Hindu law, and, most 
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inexorably, the Common Law Family and the Civil Law Family. The 
American system is then slotted into the Common Law Family, whose 
defining characteristic is said to be that it rests on a system of precedent, 
whereas the Civil Law Family rests on codified law. And the result of this 
way of thinking is, you get a lot of books with titles like "An Introduction 
to the Anglo-American Legal System." 
Now, at first glance there should be something strange about a phrase 
1 ike " the Anglo-American legal system," or with a scheme of taxonomy that 
lumps together the United States and Zimbabwe and Hong Kong in one 
basket, and France, Japan, and Brazil in another. In fact there are lots of 
things that confuse or outrage foreign students in an LL.M. program-but 
they are almost never bothered by the distinction between codified law and 
precedent. 
This observation is already enough to prompt the question in my title. 
But there are other reasons for being interested in it as well. We hear every 
day about globalization, about how business is becoming increasingly 
international, about how the Europeans, in order to compete, are adopting 
a common currency and harmonizing their legal systems. It is normal to 
wonder how American law fits into this trend and how far this process of 
international harmonization is likely to go. Should we expect other legal 
systems to Americanize their law? Or should we expect to have to 
Europeanize our own legal system? Would either of these developments be 
a good thing? And how difficult would harmonization be to carry out in 
practice?-But clearly if you are to have any hope of answering important 
questions like these, you need first to have an answer to the question, What 
is distinctive about American law? What, if anything, sets it apart from law 
in the rest of the world? And then, lurking behind these practical questions 
are a bunch of questions of legal theory, such as, What is the relation 
between law and society? What is the role of history and economics, 
ideology and culture, the legal tradition and social norms in giving shape to 
a modern legal system, and in distinguishing one legal system from 
another? 
Surprisingly little has been written on this topic by comparative 
lawyers; and in this lecture I'll try to do two things: first, to persuade you 
that the standard answers to the question that one commonly hears are 
basically inadequate. (To say that they are inadequate is not of course to 
say that they are wrong-just that they don't do as good a job as one would 
like). About this negative part of the argument I am fairly confident. But 
then I'll also try to sketch a positive answer of my own: And here I am 
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much less confident that I have gotten things right. So my suggestions about 
how to answer the question, What is so special about the An1erican legal 
system, are extremely tentative and provisional. But ifi can persuade you 
that the question is worthwhile and that the answer is much more 
complicated than it seems at first glance, that is perhaps enough progress 
for an hour. 
Before turning to the question itself, a few clarifications may be in 
order. 
First, in looking for what is distinctive about American law, it will be 
helpful if we distinguish between deep differences and superficial 
differences. To say that a difference is superficial is not to say that it is not 
important; and superficial differences can even come as a surprise. For 
example, many American lavvyers are surprised when they learn that 
contingent fees are illegal in most of the world outside the United States. 
This is clearly an important fact for a lawyer to know; but it is not a deep 
fact in the sense in which I am using the word. For the fact about contingent 
fees, by itself, has no profound conceptual or systematic implications about 
the legal system; and as soon as one is told this fact, one immediately can 
figure out the reasoning that underlies it. 
Now, it might be that all the differences between, say, the American 
and the French legal system are superficial differences like the difference 
over contingent fees. In that case, comparing the two systems would be a 
bit like comparing two fairly similar automobiles, one made by Ford and 
the other by Buick. What you have is thousands of little differences in the 
individual parts-but no deep underlying difference of principle, unlike, for 
example, the difference between a car and a refrigerator. ..if that is the sort 
of way in which the French and the American legal systems are 
distinguished, then the best we can do is simply to list the thousands of little 
differences-which would be a boring intellectual exercise (though it might 
also suggest that the harmonization of the two systems at least would not 
have to overcome some deep underlining difference of principle). 
But for this enterprise we are looking for deep differences-first, 
because that is the path of conceptual simplicity; and secondly, because the 
deep, unstated, and far-reaching assumptions are likeliest to cause 
confusion and to present an obstacle to harmonization. 
A second preliminary point. In looking for the differences between 
legal systems, I do not mean to imply that there is necessarily some unique 
way of clarifYing and grouping together various legal systems. For some 
purposes American law may be closer to Swedish law than either is to 
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Canadian law, and for other purposes not. (Tn fact, to give you an important 
example that I'll say something about later: It seems to me that American 
constitutional law is closer to German constitutional law than either is to 
British or French constitutional law.) 
Third, it is important to distinguish my question about the American 
legal system from the wider debate about what is called "American 
exceptionalism." There is an extensive sociological literature on what 
makes America different, going back at least as far as Tocqueville. This 
literature considers such questions as: Why, in contrast to every European 
country, has there never been a powerful socialist movement in the United 
States? Why does American society have a much higher rate of violent 
crime than other Western societies? Why is the rate of religious observance 
higher? And the sociologists have pointed to a lot of other features of 
American life to explain these things-the absence in America of a feudal 
past, the ready availability of land on the Western frontier, democracy and 
individualism and ethical diversity, the Constitution, and the Protestant 
work ethic, for example. 
Now, there is a complicated relationship between the sociologists' 
question, "What makes America different?" and my question, "What makes 
American law different?" Some aspects of American law-the Constitution, 
democracy, equality, and freedom of speech and religion-plainly stand in 
a complicated relationship to American society. It is of course a highly 
controversial question whether law shapes society, or society shapes law, 
or both, or neither. I wish here to set aside such worries as far as possible 
and just compare the American legal system to other legal systems-but 
recognizing that in the end the more complicated sociological questions will 
have to be addressed. 
So let us now turn to the question, "What's so special about American 
law?" 
II. 
As I just explained, the most familiar answer to this question is that, at 
least to a first approximation, American law belongs to the common-law 
family of legal systems, while much of the rest of the world follows either 
the civil law or some other legal tradition. This way of dividing up the 
world into various legal "families" or legal traditions has a distinguished 
pedigree, and goes back at least as far as Rene David's path-breaking 
scholarship. It is the standard account in the literature, and some authors go 
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so far as to speak of the "Anglo-American Legal System" as a designation 
for the common law. 
But once we have drawn the boundary line in this way, we now need 
to explain exactly what distinguishes the common law from the other legal 
traditions, and most especially from the civil law. And here the explanations 
fall into several classes. 
The first and the most familiar explains the difference as follows. In the 
civil law countries law is based on a written code, laid down by the 
legislature, whereas in the common law it is based on precedents, handed 
down by judges. Now, T do not deny that there is some truth to this 
observation; but I do deny that it is an adequate answer to our main 
question. 
In the first place, much of American law is codified either by statutes 
or by administrative regulations. The contrast applies with full strength only 
to the private law of tort, contract, and property-important areas to be 
sure, but not the whole of law. Second, even within those areas of private 
law, some common-law jurisdictions have reduced their contract law to a 
legislative code without in the process ceasing to be common-law 
jurisdictions: California offers the clearest example, but one can also think 
of those numerous jurisdictions that have enacted the Uniform Commercial 
Code. Third, the reliance of common-law judges on blackletter treatises and 
on Restatements is not in practice very different from the reliance of a 
continental judge on the Civil Code. The basic rules of contract and tort and 
property are well understood throughout the Western world, and have an 
authoritative written statement in both systems: The mere fact of legislative 
enactment makes little difference to the typical litigant. Fourth, codification 
is in fact a comparatively recent phenomenon in the civil law systems. The 
earliest code, the Napoleonic Code, is less than two hundred years old; and 
most of the countries of central Europe did not acquire a civil code until the 
start of the twentieth century. Basically, throughout the Western world one 
sees a common pattern of development. Chaotic and customary rules about 
land and promises and injuries were analyzed and reduced to order in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then were given a canonical 
formulation either in a civil code or in a treatise or in a Restatement. 
For all these reasons, then, the mere presence or absence of a civil code 
is hardly the most striking difference between law in America and law in 
the rest of the world. 
So let us turn to a second way of drawing the distinction between the 
civil law and the common law. According to this second theory, it is not the 
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civil code, but the use of judicial precedents that distinguishes the common 
law from the civil law. Once again, there is some truth to this theory; but 
once again, it is inadequate to answer our main question. The truth is that 
in a country like France, for example, judges are not legally bound by the 
doctrine of stare decisis in either its horizontal or its vertical form. That is, 
a court is only obligated to follow the Code. It is not obligated to follow its 
own precedents in an earlier case-the horizontal aspect of stare decisis. 
Even more surprisingly, a lower court is not obligated to follow the view of 
the law held by a superior court-even if the superior court has remanded 
a case back down to the lower court for decision. 
But once again it is important not to exaggerate the difference in 
attitude toward precedent. I n  the first place, when a European court has 
announced its opinion on a particular matter of law, typically it will stick to 
the same opinion in later cases for all the obvious reasons. Secondly, lower 
courts will typically follow the opinions of higher courts, both to avoid the 
embarrassment and extra work caused by a reversal, and because in many 
jurisdictions their chances of promotion suffer if they are reversed too many 
times. For all these reasons, then, despite the official dogma, the behavior 
of civil law courts in the past is a reliable guide to how they will behave in 
the future. (And in fact, in some countries such as Germany some law 
professors in some law schools have begun to teach law using the case 
method.) 
None of this is to deny that there is a difference in official dogma about 
the binding force of precedent, or to deny that the difference is important. 
But in practical terms this is not a difference that causes much confusion to 
foreigners when they come to study Law in the United States, and it does 
not mark a deep point of distinction setting apart the United States from the 
rest of the world. 
And there is a subtler reason why precedent does not play this role. It 
is often said that the common law evolved historically in England as judge­
made law, announced by the courts of the King. It is easy to slide from this 
truth into the assumption that the common law has always rested on 
precedent, and that the main task of common lawyers has always been to 
locate and cite previous judicial opinions. But in fact even in England there 
was no regular system for reporting opinions until nearly half a century 
after the American Revolution. Before that time, lawyers in England and in 
America relied on Blackstone; and before Blackstone the situation was even 
more chaotic. (Blackstone's views on precedent, by the way, are quite 
subtle. His view is not that the law is simply to be identified with the totality 
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of past judicial decisions. Rather, the law is something more abstract, 
implicit in the customs and immemorial practices of Englishmen; and the 
job of the courts is to discover what the law is. Past opinions are evidence 
of what the law is, but for Blackstone they are not the law itself.) In other 
words, the common law's reliance on judicial precedent is a relatively 
recent artifact: yet another reason for not treating precedent as the crucial 
point of division between America and the rest of the world. 
Let me briefly sum up where we are. I am t1ying to answer the question, 
"What's so special about American Law?" As a first approximation, I am 
considering the standard answer: "America is different because it is a 
Common-Law system." But when we asked, "What's so special about the 
Common Law?," the first two answers we came up with-it does not have 
a civil code, and it relies on precedents-turned out not to be terribly 
distinctive after all. 
So let us try a third approach. Some scholars have sought to explain the 
difference historically as follows. 
In the high middle ages, around the end of the eleventh century, two 
events occurred that caused English and Continental Law to pursue 
divergent paths. The first event was the Norman conquest of England in 
1066, followed by the consolidation of political power throughout the 
kingdom in the hands of a central monarchy. Law in England was 
administered in the courts of the King, and was pronounced by judges in his 
name: a degree of central control that existed nowhere else in Europe. 
The second event was the recovery around 1100, in Italy, of the written 
text of classical Roman Law, the Corpus Juris Civilis of the Emperor 
Justinian. This text was recovered just when the political leaders of the 
middle ages were seeking to consolidate their power and to improve the 
authority and sophistication of their legal systems. The Corpus Juris gave 
them exactly what they needed: a highly sophisticated body of legal rules, 
far more carefully worked out than anything else available, and enjoying all 
the prestige and authority of the Roman Empire. The texts of the Corpus 
Juris were quickly copied to be studied in universities throughout Europe, 
and they became the object of learned scholarly research, for the next 
several centuries, at the hands of the Glossators and Post-Giossators and 
Commentators. It was this law-the law of ancient Rome, as interpreted by 
medieval scholars and taught in the universities-that provided the 
foundation for the civil law legal systems. 
According to this story, the crucial difference between England and the 
Continent arises from these two events-the Norman conquest, on the one 
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hand, and the influence of Roman law on the other. On the Continent, law 
was developed by university professors; in England, it was developed by 
judges. And for this reason (the story goes), even today a judge in the 
common-law world is more highly regarded, is a figure of greater weight, 
than is a judge in the civil law; whereas for legal academics the ranking is 
reversed. And there are other differences that this account does a good job 
of describing. In the civil law, the development of law was a matter of 
interpreting an authoritative text, whereas in the common law it was a 
matter of deciding concrete cases. Where the common law represented "law 
in action," the civil law represented "law in books." The civil law was 
handed down in advance by the sovereign, while the common law had to be 
made up case-by-case. So the civil law developed from the top down, while 
the common law developed from the bottom up. And these differences in 
turn had other far-reaching consequences. The civil law, being laid out in 
advance, was more susceptible to careful logical analysis and to 
presentation as a coherent, abstract system, while the common law had a 
more chaotic structure, and looked more to the solution of concrete 
problems than to the construction of grand general principles. 
These contrasts between the civil law and the common law are familiar, 
as are their further implications for the system of legal education and for the 
courts and for scholarship. And as an explanation for the differences 
between English law and Continental law, this historical explanation in 
terms of Roman law is far better and goes far more to the root of the matter 
than the explanation in terms of the civil code or in terms of precedent. 
But still I do not believe that this explanation is good enough to answer 
our main question. I have three reasons, First, this explanation overstates 
the extent to which law in the middle ages on the Continent was directly 
inherited from Rome. Even if we leave aside the law merchant and feudal 
law and the law of the church (which included most of family law and 
contract law), what the medieval lawyer studied was not simply Roman law, 
but Roman law as interpreted by the Scholastics. The difference is crucial, 
for the entire abstract apparatus of Continental European law is a product 
of the medieval universities-and the relevant abstract categories and 
concepts were as influential in England as they were on the Continent. 
Secondly, the suggested explanation overlooks the way in which ideas 
about systematization and formalization of private law operated both in 
England and on the Continent, so that the codification movement was a 
pan-European movement, including such English figures as Bentham and 
Austin at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and Maitland and Pollock 
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at the end. Third, the Roman law explanation overstates the extent to which 
all modern legal systems have been influenced by the conditions of m odem, 
industrial mass society. Contract law and tort law in their modern forms 
scarcely existed two hundred years ago; and the Napoleonic Code famously 
devotes only five short provisions to the law of torts. The industrial 
revolution and the increasing number of accidents changed all that, 
everywhere in the Western world, and in ways that are only loosely related 
to Roman law. So the Roman law explanation seems to me not to work 
either. 
Let's try a fourth approach. So far we have been focusing on legal 
rules-the blackletter substance of the law, and how it is presented. Perhaps 
we should focus instead on institutions, and on how particular actors within 
the legal system perform their jobs-legislators and scholars, lawyers and 
judges, administrators and juries, for example. Perhaps this is where the 
dividing line between the common law and the civil law is to be found. 
And with the mention of the jury we are certainly on to something 
important, because there is no jury in civil cases on the Continent (and even 
in criminal cases it functions differently than in the common law). But let 
us stick with civil cases. In contrast to codes or precedent or even Roman 
law, this is a huge difference, and it affects almost every aspect of the 
administration of civil justice. Without a jury you do not need formal rules 
of evidence, you do not need elaborate procedures of pretrial discovery, 
indeed, you do not need a trial at all in the usual sense, but rather what the 
Continentals call a process-a series of arguments before a judge that can 
stretch on for months or years. And without a jury to act as fact-finder, 
there is no reason why an appeals court cannot review questions of fact as 
well as questions of law. 
There are immense differences, but focusing on the civil jury as the 
principal dividing line has some strange consequences. Remember that we 
were searching for a dividing line between the civil law and the common 
law. But in fact the jury in civil cases, although it is still central to American 
law, no longer exists in England (except in an insignificant range of cases). 
In other words, of the proposed differences between legal systems we have 
so far considered, the most significant turns out not to divide the common 
law from the civil law, but America from everybody else: The border is not 
where we expected it to be. 
This is a significant fact, and it will be worth our while to step back and 
consider it. So far we have seen the inadequacy of various theories to 
account in a satisfying way for the differences between various modem 
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legal systems. And the root of ail the inadequacies is the same. The 
distinction between the common law and the civil lmv systems, whether you 
try to explain it in terms of codes or precedents or the historical influence 
of the Corpus Juris, is always, in essence, a distinction between two bodies 
of private lmv rules. And it is easy to see hmv this particu Jar distinction 
could have come to loom so large in the scholarly legal consciousness. 
When the subject of comparative law first emerged in the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth, it did so when the codification 
movement was in full swing, and indeed the original purpose of 
comparative law was in large part to help legislators with the task of 
codification. In these circumstances it was naturai for comparative lawyers 
to lay great emphasis on codes and the rules of private law, and thus to 
elevate the differences between England and the Continent into a difference 
between two "legal families"-the "common law" and the "civil law." 
I do not mean to deny that there are important distinctions here, both 
historical and theoretical. But as I said at the beginning, there may be more 
than one way of dividing up the legal world, and the traditional division of 
the world into common-law systems and civil-law systems may be for our 
purposes neither the most fruitful nor the most illuminating. 
So let us now return to the civil jury. This does mark a very real 
distinction between American law on the one hand, and European law, 
including English law, on the other. But we cannot let the analysis stop 
here. For the continued existence of the civil jury in America, although it 
is an important difference, is in a certain sense not a deep difference of the 
sort I am searching for. So far all we have said is that America has the civil 
jury, and eve1ybody else doesn't. But surely the question we need to answer 
goes much deeper than this. Why have the Americans kept the civil jury, 
while the English have abandoned it? 
We need to make a fresh start. 
As I said a few moments ago, the standard explanations all focus on the 
civil codes, that is, on the substantive rules of private law. It is significant 
that the one point of divergence we have found-the jury-belongs in 
essence to the procedural law, and thus is generically close to public law. 
Moreover, the jury is not a body of rules at all, but an institution, and this 
suggests that we might look at the functioning of other institutions, such as 
legislatures and judges, law firms and scholars, for clues to the distinctive 
features of American law. 
Plainly there are a Jot of threads to disentangle here. Since time is short, 
Jet me focus on the strand of public law. 
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Certainly one distinctive feature of the American legal system is its 
reliance on a written constitution. This is an important fact, but it is one that 
needs to be treated with some care. In the first place, most legal systems in 
the developed world today rely on a written constitution. What is 
immediately different about the American Constitution is its age-a fact 
which raises the question, \Vhy was the American Constitution the first? 
Were there any distinctive features ofiaw in America that led the Founders 
to adopt a written constitution? And whatever those features were, they 
must have diverged from the mother country, because Great Britain today 
is the only European nation without a written constitution. (In other words, 
what matters here is not the existence of a written constitution, but the role 
it plays within the overall system of American law. Is there anything 
distinctive, then, about the way we use our Constitution?) 
Here an obvious answer suggests itself. The American legal system 
makes heavy use of judicial review. This is certainly an important fact, and 
sets the United States apart from countries such as Britain and France. In 
both of those countries (although this is changing under the impact of the 
European Union) the Parliament is supreme, and the courts have no 
authority to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional. 
But this theory is unsatisfactory as well, for two reasons. First, although 
it distinguishes the United States from Britain and from France, it does not 
work nearly so well for the rest of Europe. In particular, the German 
Constitution sets up a special constitutional court whose sole purpose is to 
decide questions of constitutionality, and which has broad powers to strike 
down acts of the Legislature. The constitutional experience of other 
countries (such as Italy and Austria) has been similar. Secondly, and more 
subtly, there is a problem of historical timing with this explanation. 
Remember what it is that we are trying to explain. We want to explain why 
the Americans were the first to adopt a written constitution (even though 
Britain did not); and we want to explain what features of American 
constitutionalism set it apart. But however powerful a force judicial review 
has been in the twentieth century, it was used only sparingly prior to the 
Civil War, and it is of course not mentioned at all in the Constitution itself. 
I am assuming that American law in 1830 was already quite different from 
European law; but if this is so, judicial review did not cause the divergence. 
In other words, important though judicial review undoubtedly is, it is itself 
one of the phenomena that we need to explain. 
Let us pause to see where we are. I have been looking for an answer to 
the question, "What is so special about American law?" The standard 
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approach in the treatises of comparative law-the "legal families" 
approach-says that the world is to be divided up into the civil-law family 
and the common-law family, and that American law is a species of common 
law. But when we looked at this answer more closely we found that it broke 
down in two ways. First, even when we confined our attention to codes and 
precedents and the mechanics of private law adjudication, we found that the 
differences between the two families were less deep or surprising than is 
commonly supposed: Whatever may distinguish American law from the rest 
of the world, it is not the fact that American judges generally follow 
precedent cases. Secondly, as soon as we looked away from private law we 
found several far more significant differences between the leading legal 
systems of the Western world-for instance, the civil jury, written 
constitutions, and judicial review. And this list could easily be extended. 
But more importantly, once we descend to this level of detail, the 
differences between the principal systems do not seem to correlate in any 
interesting way to the distinction between the civil law and the common 
law. The dividing lines not only do not match up, but cut across each other 
in every possible way. This is an important point, so let's consider some 
examples. On some issues, such as federalism or gun control or the death 
penalty, the United States is on one side and all the European legal systems 
on the other. On judicial review, Germany and the United States are on one 
side, Britain and France on the other. Britain has a monarchy, an established 
Church, and a House of Lords; France, Germany, and America do not. 
Germany has a constitutional guarantee of a social welfare state; France, 
Britain, and America do not. 
This list could easily be continued, but it is already long enough to let 
us draw an important negative conclusion. The standard taxonomy that 
divides the world into common-law systems and civil-law systems, however 
natural it may have seemed to comparative lawyers at the end of the 
nineteenth century, is no longer a useful tool of analysis. It obscures rather 
than illuminates what is truly distinctive about various legal systems, and 
it is an obstacle rather than a help in answering our principal question. 
This is so far only a negative result, though an extremely important one. 
There are a good number of books purporting to introduce foreign law 
students to "the Anglo-American legal system"; but if my argument is 
correct, there does not exist any such system any more than there exists an 
Anglo-Italian system or a Franco-American one. 
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III. 
This negative conclusion leaves us with a puzzle about how to proceed. 
We still have to face the question, "What is so special about American 
law?" What deep aspects of the American legal system are most likely to 
cause confusion to a foreigner, and how are they best to be explained? 
This question requires a positive answer, and it looks as though there 
are two ways we might proceed. The first would be simply to throw up our 
hands and acquiesce in the conclusion that there are a great number of 
variables that separate one legal system from another and that these 
variables are independent of one another. So we would explain the 
American legal system essentially by pointing to a list of these 
variables-judicial review, civil juries, federalism, the death penalty, 
contingent fees, separation of church and state, the Electoral College, and 
so on-but not try to find any sort of hidden unity behind this list. And it 
may in fact be true that there is no such hidden unity to be found-that 
there are no "deep" differences between legal systems, but only an 
accumulation of surface differences, and that looking for a deep, underlying 
distinction between the machinery of American law and French law is, as 
I said earlier, like looking for a deep, underlying difference between a Ford 
and a Buick. 
Now this conclusion, if it is correct, would have important implications 
for legal theory and for questions about the evolution of law, the nature of 
legal transplants, the relative weight to be given to legal ideas as opposed 
to legal rules, and the prospects for harmonizing two distinct legal systems; 
and it may be that, in fact, this is the best we c
_
an do. These are complicated 
questions and I have no time to pursue them here, or to explain why, as a 
matter of legal theory, this pessimistic conclusion seems to me unlikely to 
be true. 
Let me instead pursue the second course, which is to continue the 
search for deep differences between legal systems, independent of the old 
distinction between civil law and common law. 
It will be a good idea to start by getting a firmer grasp on the question 
to be answered. I said earlier that in fact foreign law students are rarely 
puzzled by the American system of case law. So what does puzzle them? 
It is not hard to make a list: Here are some examples. 
The civil jury I have already mentioned-and the fact that it leads to a 
complex and unfamiliar set of rules about pretrial discovery as well as to a 
set of rules of evidence law and to complex interactions between judge and 
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jury. The entire system of federal courts, and the interactions between the 
state and federal judicial systems, are almost uniquely an American 
phenomenon: The only real parallel (and it is not very close) is the 
interaction between the European Court of Justice and the legal systems of 
the European member states. The death penalty is found nowhere in 
Europe. Nor is the American system of plea bargaining. Nor are contingent 
fees for lawyers. I f  we turn to legal scholarship, intellectual movements 
such as law and economics or critical race theory have no real counterparts. 
Perhaps most startling of all is the American practice of electing judges and 
prosecutors, and of allowing them to run what is in effect a political 
campaign, complete with campaign contributions and the support of a 
political party. 
I t  is phenomena like these, and not the mere citation of cases as 
precedents, that cause the most surprise to foreign lawyers studying the 
American legal system for the first time. I t  can be downright embarrassing 
to try to explain to them a case like BA1W v. Gore, 1 in which an Alabama 
jury gave eight million dollars in punitive damages because BMW had 
repaired a scratch on his new car. I n  no other legal system in the civilized 
world can an unsupervised jury impose what is in effect a criminal penalty 
without any of the normal protections of criminal procedure, from the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the prohibition against 
arbitrary or excessive criminal sanctions that have not been clearly 
specified in advance. And then try to explain that the judge faced re­
election by the voters of Alabama, and that a large slice of the eight million 
dollars went to the lawyers, who were working on a contingent fee! In most 
of the rest of the world these facts would be viewed as incompatible with 
the rule of law and would be strictly illegal. And the situation is even worse 
when you try to explain how a criminal defendant facing the death penalty 
could be tried by an unsupervised jury, a prosecutor who is running for 
public office, a judge who is up for re-election, and a bored and underpaid 
public defender. 
My goal is not to condemn these features of the American legal system, 
or to defend them, but to understand why they exist in America and 
virtually nowhere else. Is there some common thread that unites them, some 
common explanation for their existence? 
I think there is, and it goes something like this. 
I. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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When you listen to an American and a European lawyer talk about a 
case like BJv!W it is striking how often the argument will end up sounding 
like this. On the one hand, the American \VOuld say that, yes, the jury award 
in that case was excessive. But Americans trust juries and the good sense 
of the people, and the occasional BMW case is a small price to pay for a 
democratic society that allows the direct participation of the people in the 
legal process. And similarly for the election of judges and prosecutors. 
These, just like a governor or a senator, are exercising a political power in 
the name of the people, and so it is important that they, too, be held 
democratically accountable at regular elections. On the other hand, the 
European is likely to say that yes, it is indeed important to keep the power 
of the state under control, but that the American system does so in an 
unprofessional manner and rnns the risk of turning a trial away from the 
impartial administration of justice and into a species of mob rule. 
With this debate I think we are close to an extensively fundamental 
distinction between the European and the American ways of thinking about 
their legal systems. It is important to notice that the terms and categories 
employed by both sides are subtly different. The American appeal is to the 
people, to direct democracy, and to electoral accountability: Notions like 
the state and professionalization play a distinctly secondary role, though 
they are primary for the European. 
As I said, this fact seems to me a deep and fundamental point of 
difference. The American legal system, to a greater extent than any other 
Western legal system, encourages the direct injection of democratic values 
into the legal process. Our legal system, like our society, places great 
emphasis on the value of equality. We do not fully trust professional elites. 
In France and Germany judges receive special professional training and are 
promoted up through the ranks of a bureaucratic hierarchy where they are 
comparatively insulated from party politics. In America, judges receive no 
specialjudicial training and are often deeply involved in party politics. The 
American system values equality. We distrust hierarchies, we distrust big 
government, and for the same reasons we distrust elites. In contrast to any 
European country we place a greater faith in individual rights and freedoms, 
and in a deregulated market economy. These are deep tendencies in 
American legal thought, and it seems to me that they underlie the various 
phenomena I mentioned earlier that so surprise foreign lawyers: the 
populism of our jury system; the political involvement of judges and 
prosecutors and pub! ic defenders; the phenomena of ambulance chasers and 
contingent fees and the relatively unprofessional nature of the American 
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law; the attractiveness of free-market theories of law and economics; the 
openly political nature of judicial review and of our process of appointing 
justices to the Supreme Court; even such phenomena as the popularity of 
the death penalty or of critical race theory or of plea bargaining-all of 
these things are best seen in light of the deeply political nature of the 
American legal system, its commitment to egalitarian and democratic 
values, and its broadly based populism. To repeat the main claim of my 
talk: It  is these phenomena that constitute the deepest and most distinctive 
features of the American legal system and that make it so special, and it is  
these phenomena we need to explain, and not the relatively trivial fact that 
American judges sometimes rely on precedents when foreign judges rely 
on a c ivil code. 
But to say this is not yet to solve the problem, only to identify it. How 
are we to account for these differences? How did they arise, and how are 
they to be justified? 
It might be thought that some deep characteristics of American society 
are in play here, and that the sociological literature on American 
exceptionalism might provide us with an answer. But I fear this avenue will 
not carry us very far. The sociological literature on this matter seems to 
divide into two types. One type points to the social or economic structure, 
and observes that American legal institutions grew up against the backdrop 
of a wide-open frontier, or that America never had feudalism or a hereditary 
aristocracy. But countries like Australia or Canada or Russia have had 
frontiers; and institutions like feudalism or aristocracy are themselves legal 
institutions of precisely the sort we need to explain. The other type of 
sociological account is more ideological and consists in pointing out that the 
"American creed" is committed to equality, democracy, populism, free­
market economics, liberty, and pluralism. But if you then ask the 
sociologists why Americans are committed to these things, their answers 
typically point to the Constitution or some other feature of the legal system. 
So we just end up traveling in a circle, and indeed are likely to end with the 
suspicion that the exceptional features of American society are to be 
explained in terms of the exceptional features of American law rather than 
vice vers a. 
So where does that leave us? If my argument so far has been right, we 
can draw two conclusions: first, that there are a large number of significant 
differences between American law and Jaw everywhere else, and second, 
that those differences seem to cluster around certain ideological aspects of 
the American legal system. 
2001] What's So i:;pec'ial About American Law ? 1099 
As I said at the beginning, I am not exactly sure how the analysis goes 
from here. But let me close by giving you a quick sketch of the beginnings 
of an account of where the principal differences come from. 
Very roughly, it is important to remember that the modem European 
states are all, in one way or another, the heirs of the monarchies of the late 
middle ages. The kings and queens of early modern Europe had 
consolidated power in the hands of a unitary system of administrators and 
judges, all answering directly to the monarch. In the days of Louis XIV and 
the early Stuarts, of Bodin and Hobbes and Filmer, the legal thinkers of the 
t ime analyzed the legal system in terms of sovereignty and its close relative, 
the state. Every state, on this classical account, contains a single, absolute 
sovereign, who is the source of all law, whom all his subjects obey, but who 
himself is not bound by the laws he hands down. The roots of this 
conception go well back into the middle ages and all the way to Roman law. 
But for our purposes the important point to remember is that, at the time of 
the French and American Revolutions, when the modem Western legal 
systems were being created, the central organizing concept of European 
legal thought was the idea of the state, the inheritor of the powers of the old 
monarchies. When the k ings were abolished or their powers limited, the 
state was still the central and most conspicuous aspect of political life. It 
was there, in all its power: And the central question of European political 
theory was, how do we control it? How do we limit its awesome power? 
And the answer they gave went something I ike this. In the modem state, 
it is essential to separate the powers of the legislature from the powers of 
the executive. The legislature is the representative of the will of the People; 
but it is constrained to pass general laws of prospective application that will 
be applied by an independent bureaucracy to the entire population, 
including the legislators themselves. The executive bureaucracy is to take 
these general rules and see that they are impartially and mechanically 
applied. To guarantee against corruption, the bureaucracy must be 
independent of improper political influences. That is, it must be a 
professional, specially trained civil service, with security of tenure, whose 
loyalty is not to the government, but to something quite different: the state. 
This conception of an independent, professional, state bureaucracy is of 
course an elitist conception. The civil service, on this view, needs to be 
isolated from the forces of populist politics and needs to be specially 
educated to perform its tasks. And it is not hard to see the parallels between 
this ideal of a state bureaucracy and the European ideal of a judge. The 
judge, too, is to be an impartial administrator of justice, professionally 
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trained, and owing loyalty to the state rather than to the government. The 
task of the judge is impartially and mechanically to apply the general rules 
laid down by the legislature in its statutes and in the Civil code :  I t  is to be 
a kin d of highly sophisticated and professional technician , but not an 
independent force for political change. 
But in A merica the development was very different. We, too, in 1 7 8 7 ,  
faced the central problem of limiting and controlling the exerc ise of 
political power. But our theoretical framework was not at all the same. The 
British monarchy had never had as firm a grip on the American colonies as 
it had in England itself. And at the time of the Constitutional Convention 
there simply did not exist in America anything like a European state. 
Instead we had thirteen separate states-and it is a striking fact that even 
today the American legal system does not employ the concept of the stale 
as an analytical legal category at all: We talk instead of the government. 
And the American solution to the problem of political power was different 
too. We do not rely on an elite bureaucracy or professionalization to control 
a centralized state. Instead, we break up power both horizontally (with the 
separation of powers) and vertically (between the federal and the state 
governments). And we rely throughout on a grass-roots conception of 
popular sovereignty, on the direct, democratic participation of the people, 
entrusting them with wide discretion to elect judges or sit on civil juries, 
just as they participate actively in the political process. 
(It is for this reason, I think, that Europeans react so strongly to a case 
like BMW. They view it as an almost incomprehensible delegation of state 
power to the free discretion of unprofessional lay jurors. For them, this 
looks like a subversion of one of the basic principles of the rule of law-a 
surrender of the awesome power of the state to a kind of populist mob 
justice. But if one were to propose to an American lawyer the abolition of 
civil juries, and the consolidation of judicial power in the hands of a 
professional class of mandarins insulated from democratic political 
accountability, you would run up against a very different tradition of legal 
thought.) 
It seems to me that the deepest differences between the American and 
the European legal systems are all linked, in  one way or  another, to these 
two different ways of thinking about the state and popular democracy. The 
American system of federalism, our continued use of the civil jury, the 
election of judges, the discretion to award punitive damages, the distrust of 
professional elites, are all, I think, heavily influenced by this deep, 
underlying difference. 
' .  
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As I said at  the begin n i n g, I am not  sure about how the deta i l s  of th is 
argument are to be worked out from here . A !l I have tried to do in th is  taik 
i s  address the question, "What is  so special about American law?" And I 
h ave made two cla ims.  
First, that the standard answers given i n  the standard textbooks of 
comparative law do n ot work. Whatever is  m ost dist inctive about American 
l mv i s  not a m atter of civ i l  codes or j udic ia l  precedents or the rules of 
Rom an private law.  Second, that there are some surpri s i ng and d ist inctive 
features of the American legal system that set it apart i n  interesting ways 
from other Western l egal systems, and that these features appear to be 
l i n ked, i n  complex and subtle ways, to certai n  deep tra its i n  the way 
Americans and Europeans th ink about the control of state power, and that 
those styles of thought go back to what an earl ier  Quin lan l ecturer, B e rn ard 
Bai lyn, s ig n ificantly called the ideological origins of the American 
Revolution .  I h ave not tried here to exp lore a l l  the deta i l s, which is a task 
that woul d  take us deeply i n to legal theory and into A merican and European 
l egal h istory . But I hope at l east to h ave persuaded you of the importance 
o f th e  questi on,  " What is so .special about the American legal system?" and 
of h ow m uch m ore d ifficult this question is to answer than seems at first 
glance. 
